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RESEARCH ARTICLE

UKRAINIAN CRISIS AND CRIMEA AS EPICENTRE: A TRIANGULAR POLITICAL IMPASSE AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF COLD WAR FROM A REALIST AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

The tension and cinematic events unfolding in Ukraine, especially in its part of Crimea, is a move seemingly replicating the cold war. The political impasse is triangular in nature due to the involvement of Moscow, the west and Kiev in the crisis. The paper examines the nature of the current crisis in Ukraine and analyses the relationship between the hitherto Russo-American containment and rivalry under the era of cold war. With the aid of library instruments, the paper discovers that, secession of Crimea is a reality, where Russia will never allow her borders threatened by the existence of the west in Ukraine. The paper concludes that, Russia and the west are in a critical contest for the ownership and control of Ukraine, as the situation exacerbates, the annexation of Crimea by Russia is the best solution, that is, win-win situation. The paper also recommends that, maximum restraint should be exercised by the united states and NATO under the European union, as excess pressure may result to a third world war, among other things.

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INTRODUCTION

The Truman doctrine of March 12, 1947 was a prelude to the events that shaped international politics of the 1950's and beyond. The major content of the Truman doctrine was contained in the speech of the then American president Harry Truman. It was made to salvage Greece and turkey from being attached to the communist world. In this era, there was a strong struggle by both Russia and the United States to inculcate and propagate western or eastern ideologies among weaker nations. The United States was consolidating efforts in Western Europe, while Russia was expanding in the east. But the major objective of Truman, however, was to break countries of both eastern and western Europe from having any communist affiliation. The Truman doctrine was committed to assist Greece and turkey to free them from communist annexation. In the argument of George McGhee, The Truman Doctrine was seen as an international relations policy set forth by the U.S. President Harry Truman in support of Greece and Turkey with economic and military aid to prevent them from falling into the Soviet sphere (George McGhee, 1990). Containment therefore is a strategy adopted by the United States on how to be patient, vigilant, firm and strategic against the spread of communism and the expansion of soviet influence in the world that emerged after the Second World War. Alan bullock has intellectually written about the Truman doctrine and has captured the submission made by in the

speech of Harry Truman himself when he addressed the American congress. That the doctrine was set: "to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures (Alan Bullock and Ernest Bevin, 2008)." The reason given by Harry Truman of initiating this American foreign policy was that, the doctrine was to free people from "totalitarian regimes" which coerced "free peoples". For Truman, communism and Russia were serving as a threat to international peace and the national security of the United States (Dennis Merrill, 2006). Consequently, many scholars see the Truman doctrine as the beginning of the cold war (Spalding and Elizabeth Edwards, 2006).

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The material used in this research work encompasses the library documented literatures. It envelopes written and printed documents such as books, journals, periodicals, news papers, magazines, reports and the internet as another source of information. The methodology in this order is identified as the secondary method of data collection. The material and method is also supported by a theoretical framework.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework adopted in this research is the realist theory. The realist theory is all about power, state interest and security. All the proponents of the school of realism (scholars like Morgenthau, Herz, Keohene, Thomas Hobbes, Kenneth Thompson etc) believe that states have no option other than to

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acquire power in order to stand firm within the comity of nations. Power here may include military, economic, territorial, population and many more. Power is indispensable in international relations due to its anarchic nature. Russia must acquire more territories or nations as allies to stand the western competition. The west is also prone to that, but the loss of Crimea by Russia will be a great threat to the security of Russian federation-hence, the call for Crimea be annexed in order to curtail the level of security threat.

Objectives

The major objectives of this paper are: (a) to revisit the conditions that shaped the era of cold war (b) to look into the current Ukrainian crisis and see how it replicates the hitherto cold war (c) to investigate on the causes of the Ukrainian crisis and the case of Crimea (d) to look at the triangular struggle for influence on Ukraine between Moscow, the west and Kiev (e) to look at the possible solutions to the problem engulfing the Ukrainian polity.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

With the twilight of the Second World War and the destruction of the European multipolar structure, the United States emerged the strongest economy in the world. Russia despite the devastating effect of the war, it stood to be strong after the United States militarily. With the severe damage on Europe, the west depended on the United States, and after the defeat of Japan, Russia emerged the strongest in the eastern pole, while the US maintained the western pole. This trend, however, has created an enabling environment for the struggle of super-power vacuum between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The cold war was a political and economic struggle between the Western and Eastern blocs with the former led by the United States and the latter by the Soviet Union. There was a scramble for ideological annexation and hegemony, where by the united states was campaigning for capitalist ideology and was looking for ideological allies all over the world. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was also building on its ideology looking for allies that would support communism. In fact it was like an ideological market, because, the united state s could give money to sell capitalist ideology after offer and acceptance have been made. It was obvious that the Soviet Union had supported groups and rebels' fighting against their government, looking for freedom and revolution, and the United States was busy arming such governments with weapons in order to contain the spread of communism. The cold war was also a period of contestation, competition and confrontation. Military threat was at its zenith. The possession of nuclear weapons by both the United States and America was justified; there was also the existence of collateral damage. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis saw the cold war under a great danger, another Great War on the verge of erupting, but it was deterred, for that is why it was a cold war. The difference between cold war and bipolarity has been provided by Lundestad Eirik B. and Tor G. Jakobsen when they wrote:

Bipolarity is used to denote the basic structure in the international system when it is dominated by two superpowers. This means that other states must ally themselves with one of

the two major powers, which again limits their room to maneuver and thus result in more stable international politics. The Cold War is considered as a relatively peaceful period of history, taking into account the absence of wars between the major powers. The bipolar balance of power was also a superpower rivalry between the East and the West, where fear and suspicion characterized the relationship between the two major powers, and confrontation (although not direct war between the two) was commonplace (Lundestad et al., 2011).

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the cold war

Historians and scholars of international relations have been asking the question of why Khrushchev went unilaterally and installed offensive missiles in Cuba despite the promises he made not to install them, and the promise made not to embarrass Kennedy during a congressional election campaign. Some of the reasons why Khrushchev took Russian missiles to Cuba can be considered as follows (Charles L. Robertson, 1997): It was a retaliatory move made by Khrushchev, against the United States, as it went to Hungary in 1956 and installed offensive missiles. Historians may however argue that Khrushchev did that in Cuba in order to avenge this particular American move. The United States had also installed some medium range Jupiter missiles in turkey t the time of Khrushchev's boasts of missiles superiority. The proximity of Hungary and Turkey from Russia was perceived as so close for the United States to have put its offensive missiles there. Khrushchev had however, made the decision to install missiles in Cuba in order to retaliate this move by the United States.

Implication of the Cuban Missile Crisis to both Russia and the United States

It was very clear that, the United States in case of any attack on its soil; it had the capability to make an immediate retaliation. It was also evident that in case of any outbreak of war, the Russians could have inflicted a severe damage on the states. In the parlance however, there was a possibility of a collateral damage, but it must be noted that, the United States had under its possession, more weapons in its stock than Russia. Kennedy was furious about Russia's action, but he consulted his advisers on how to deal with the issue. Kennedy and his advisers all agreed that the Russian missiles and bombers had to go, but the only differences were on how to get them out of Cuba. Some of the suggested strategies are (Ibid): One group suggested that, the United States should offer to withdraw its American medium range Jupiter missiles in turkey in return for the withdrawal of those in Cuba, and to publicize the matter at the UN and the use of world pressure there.


- The second group of advisers suggested an immediate air strike or invasion. Their argument is that, to offer an exchange would open the administration to blackmail under other circumstances, and believed that the reckless prime minister must be taught an immediate lesson, even at the risk of war.
- The third group offered an intermediate way out. Their suggestion is that the United States should make use of the threat of invasion or an air strike and naval blockade to pressure the Russians to withdraw.

The Khrushchev's Calculation

Khrushchev was very much aware about the American preparation and of the American capability, so he could not have sacrificed all of Russia over the issue, and he was completely aware of the awesome nature of the American nuclear force. It was certain that by the time of the crisis, the United States had 300 intercontinental and submarine ballistic missiles, while Russia had about 80 (Ibid). Finally, Kennedy received two messages from Khrushchev: one, offered withdrawal in return for a pledge not to invade Cuba, and the other message called for mutual missile withdrawal from Cuba and Turkey (Ibid). President Kennedy chose the first offer and ignored the latter. Under the bipolar order, the two rival camps had supported conflicts and rivalry all over the world. For example, the Soviets supported Somalia during their hey-days of conflict, while the United States supported Ethiopia, but this trend was later altered. It is in line with the above that Lundestad Eirik and Tor Jakobsen argue:


The superpowers supported different sides in conflicts during the Cold War, especially in Africa and Asia which often were the battlegrounds for rivalry between the two blocks. The total number of armed conflicts in this period was when the Soviet economy began to crumble, nationalist agitation began to take shape in Eastern Europe; some regions (especially the Balkan region) broke away from the Soviet control (Ibid).

Below are figures showing the strength of USSR and the US under the cold war:



Source: Hansen, Chuck, 1988, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History*, Aerofax (Arlington, TX), pp. 147-148.


Fig. 1. Number of High Yield Weapons (USA, USSR/RUS)



Source: Hansen, Chuck, 1988, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History*, Aerofax (Arlington, TX), pp. 147-148.

Fig. 2. Total Yield of High Weapons (USA, USSR/RUS)

From the above figure, it can be seen that, the levels of high yield weapons as possessed by both US and Russia have almost similar level of collateral damage. With the United States provoking Russia, Russia has the capability to retaliate and cause a remorseful damage on the US.



Source: Hansen, Chuck, 1988, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History*, Aerofax (Arlington, TX), pp. 147-148.

Fig. 3. Fraction Of Stockpile In High-Yield Weapons (USA, USSR/RUS)

It is clear from the above figure that the fraction of weapons' stockpile in both Russia and the United States are destructive. Albeit the United States has more stockpiles than Russia, but Russia has a capability to counter-attack.

This trend justified the Wilson's fourteen points especially during the Turkish dominance. Wilson's fourteen points provided an avenue for people to have freedom and independence, and break the chains of domination and colonialism and subjugation of any kind. This tallies with the Harry Truman doctrine. The arms race reached its peak, the Soviet economy became feeble:

The Cold War ended after the Soviet economy had stagnated following their participation in the arms race with the USA, and also as a result of declining oil prices in the 1980s. A later attempt to introduce a market economy failed, the power of the communist party was undermined, East European countries declared independence, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and finally the world saw the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. When the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned in 1991 it marked the end of the bipolar era in world politics (Ibid).

The Unipolar Order

The unipolar order envisages the political, economic and military dominance of one major power over all other international states in world politics. The United States have come to dominate all spheres of world politics ranging from technological know-how, military industrial complex, military might, economic progress, trade and commerce. It has also become the world leading force in war and peace. The impact of this order on the United States therefore, is that, the stability of the order is not guaranteed, due to the perpetual influence of the weaker powers and the continuous attempt to break the power of the unipolar order. The economy of the United States may also experience a waning process. The growth of unipolar order in international politics is not something that seems to be

Table 1. U.S. Nuclear Warheads with Yield Over 4.5 Megatons

warhead (system)	type of system	stock entry	IOC	off alert	retired	Warhead type	weight (kg)	yield (mt)	no. built
EC14	NGB	Feb 1954	Feb 1954	Oct 1954	Oct 1954	2-stage TN	13133	6.9	5
EC16	NGB	Mar 1954	Mar 1954	Apr 1954	Apr 1954	2-stage TN, standard	~17000?	7.5	5
EC17	NGB	May 1954	May 1954	Nov 1954	Nov 1954	2-stage TN	18900	11	5
Mk-17	NGB	Oct 1954	Oct 1954	1957	Oct 1957	2-stage TN	18900	~12.5	200
B21	NGB	Dec 1955	1956	1957	Nov 1957	2-stage TN, clean 2-stage TN, dirty	7000	4.5	275
EC24	NGB	Apr 1954	Apr 1954	Nov 1954	Nov 1954	2-stage TN	18900	13.5	10
Mk-24	NGB	Oct 1954	Oct 1954	1956	Oct 1956	2-stage TN	18900	~15	105
B27	NGB	Nov 1958	1958	1964	Jul 1964	2-stage TN, dirty	1430	~5	700
B36 Y1	NGB	Apr 1956	1956	~1961	Jan 1962	2-stage TN, dirty	7900	9.5	940
B36 Y2						2-stage TN, clean		6	
B41 Y1	NGB	Sep 1960	1960	1976	Jul 1976	3-stage TN, dirty	4840	~25	500
B41 Y2						3-stage TN, clean		~9.3	
B53 Y1	NGB	Aug 1962	~Oct 1962	1997	2006	2-stage TN, dirty	4010	9	340
B53 Y2		Jun 1964	~1964	?	?	2-stage TN, clean	3860	?	
W53 (Titan II)	ICBM	Dec 1962	Apr 1963	May 1987	~1988	2-stage TN	3690	9	60
W71 (Spartan)	ABM	Jul 1974	Apr 1975	Nov 1975	1995	2-stage TN, enhanced x-ray	1290	~4.8	39

Source: Cochran, Thomas B., William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Milton M. Hoenig, 1987, *Nuclear Weapons Databook Vol. II: U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production*, Ballinger Publ. Co. (Cambridge, MA), p. 10. ; Natural Resources Defense Council, 25 Nov. 2002, "Table of US Strategic Bomber Forces", on line, *Natural Resources Defense Council* [http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab7.asp].

Analysis: IOC=initial operational capability, NGB=nuclear gravity bomb, ICBM=intercontinental ballistic missile, ABM=antiballistic missile, TN=thermonuclear, clean/dirty refers to low/high fission yield fraction, respectively. See text for sources.

Table 2. Soviet/Russian Nuclear Warheads with Yield Over 4.5 Megatons

System (U.S. des.) [warhead]	type	stock entry	IOC	off alert	retired	type	weight (kg)	yield (mt)	no. built
R-16 (SS-7 Mod 1/2/3)	ICBM		Nov 1961	1977			1950	~6	0-320
R-9A (SS-8)	ICBM		Dec 1964	1976			1800	~5	23-46
R-36 8K67 Tsiklon (SS-9 Mod 1)	ICBM		Nov 1966	1980			7000	18	140-290
R-36 8K67 Tsiklon (SS-9 Mod 2) [8F675]	ICBM		1966	1980			7000	25	140-290
R-36O 8K69 Tsiklon (SS-9 Mod 3)	FOBS		Aug 1969	Jan 1983			5000	~20	0-20
MR UR-100N (SS-17 Mod 2)	ICBM		1977	1984			3500	~5	10-30
R-36M (SS-18 Mod 1) [15B86]	ICBM		Dec 1974	~1978			7500	24	20-60
R-36MUTTKh (SS-18 Mod 3)	ICBM		1976	1990			7300	20	20-60
R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 6)	ICBM		Aug 1990				9000	20	20
UR-100NU (SS-19 Mod 2)	ICBM		1977				3500	~5	60
RDS-220 ("Tsar Bomba")	NGB						27000	~150	0-5
	NGB							50	0-20
	NGB							~20	0-120
	NGB						~5000?	~5	?

Source: Norris, Robert S., and William M. Arkin, July 1994, "Nuclear Notebook," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.

permanent. This is largely because, the overwhelming overload ship of global responsibility may gradually fade the superpower structure of the US, and many states may emerge to replace the concurrent global order. It is, however, in line with the above that Lundestad and Jakobsen observe:

unipolarity is unstable because it is progressing toward multipolarity, as other powers will seek to break the hegemony of the superpower. ... "The strongest is never enough to always be master." Even though the superpower can restrain this development, at least in the short run, the power will eventually be weakened as a consequence of dominating other states. The USA has as an example, tried to clinch hegemonic power by keeping 100,000 troops stationed in Asia and Europe. By guaranteeing the safety of its allies, the USA has subdued the need for security for other states...This has prevented these states from participating in an arms race. However, the dominance is costly, and has limited the USA's economic growth. In the longer term this will decrease U.S. power because other states do not have the same costs (Francis Fukuyama, 1992).

Fukuyama's End of History

With the demise of the European multipolar order and the subsequent emergence of bipolarity, many empires have crumbled, cultures transformed into European or western one. The collapse of the Soviet Union and communism, an American scholar, Francis Fukuyama wrote an interesting essay titled: "the end of history..." in Fukuyama's argument, the world order has come to the end of history. But the primary question that every reader of Fukuyama's text would like to ask is: why is it an end of history? Fukuyama has made an important observation of the global order, and he came with the conclusion that, with the collapse of fascism and communism and with the survival of western European values of liberalism and democracy, history has come to an end. For Fukuyama, throughout the history of man, western liberal values have come to stay, and this has made Europe economically and politically stable. Albeit Fukuyama argues that, the transformation process of the end of history is still in process, because some countries in other regions have not finally transformed, he is optimistic that, such regions and nations will

be characterized by religious and ethnic conflicts. Terrorism will also be the other of the day. Fukuyama has even provided a shield for his own argument, for his believe and expectation that one may ask about the Asian tigers and growth in Asia. In his argument, the Asian economy is only able to reach where it is today because it embraces some elements of western capitalism and economic liberalism. Fukuyama argues:

What Asia's postwar economic miracle demonstrates is that capitalism is a path toward economic development that is potentially available to all countries. No underdeveloped country in the Third World is disadvantaged simply because it began the growth process later than Europe, nor is the established industrial powers capable of blocking the development of a latecomer, provided that country plays by the rules of economic liberalism (Ibid).

Should we agree with the inference of Fukuyama or we should adopt a complete different methodology in analyzing the unipolar order and his assertion of the end of history? Credit must be given to Fukuyama for his critical observation and his intellectual submission to the global academic environment especially history and world politics. It is discerning that Fukuyama was influenced and inspired by the events of history especially after the Second World War. We may consider his insight and intake of Nazi Germany, how Hitler tried to dominate Europe through conquest, with political party that showed historical frustration and the quest for global conquest. This idea and movement made by Hitler and his co-nationalists failed. The development of fascism by Benito Mussolini of Italy, which was also seen as religion, failed in their struggle to spread the ideology. We have also seen the rise and fall of the Soviet Union, which in its hue developed a political and economic system that flourished all over Europe and other parts of Latin America, Asia and Africa, but today such practice has competed with the western liberal ideology and failed. Fukuyama would like to remind us of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its split into fifteen different entities: Russia; Lithuania; Moldova; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Belarus; Latvia; Armenia; Uzbekistan; Kyrgyzstan; Ukraine; Estonia; Azerbaijan; Turkmenistan and; Tajikistan. But in his assertion, Fukuyama also holds the view that, this western type of liberal democracy is not the most just and the best, but because it has survived all trial periods and crossed the hurdles of history. Fukuyama maintains optimistically that:

Remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism. More than that, however, I argued that liberal democracy may constitute the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government," and as such constituted the "end of history." That is, while earlier forms of government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions. This was not to say that today's stable democracies, like the United States, France, or Switzerland, were not without injustice or serious social problems (Ibid).

Another evidence that is notable from Fukuyama's argument, is the Arab spring: the protest carried out by Arabs in the middle east which started from Tunisia and met a traffic in Syria, is another reason why we may agree with Fukuyama. This shows how the world and people of different historical backgrounds clamoring for the so-called western liberal democratic values. Gaddafi was deposed and murdered, Hosni Mubarak was shoved from power, Syria on the road to revolution, Bahrain was not ignored, and even Saudi Arabia was not left behind because there were demonstrations for change in the monarchy. In trying to vindicate himself, Fukuyama tried to let know that the inference of the end of history is not derived from his own fabrication, but rather, a continuation and the growth of what ancient philosophers have laid its foundation for long. In this respect, Fukuyama inferred:

And yet what I suggested had come to an end was not the occurrence of events, even large and grave events, but History: that is, history understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process, when taking into account the experience of all peoples in all times. This understanding of History was most closely associated with the great German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel. It was made part of our daily intellectual atmosphere by Karl Marx, who borrowed this concept of History from Hegel, and is implicit in our use of words like "primitive" or "advanced," "traditional" or "modern," when referring to different types of human societies. For both of these thinkers, there was a coherent development of human societies from simple tribal ones based on slavery and subsistence agriculture, through various theocracies, monarchies, and feudal aristocracies, up through modern liberal democracy and technologically driven capitalism. This evolutionary process was neither random nor unintelligible, even if it did not proceed in a straight line, and even if it was possible to question whether man was happier or better off as a result of historical progress (Ayaan Hirsi Ali, 2013)

A Paradox of Fukuyama's Analogy

As noted above, Fukuyama has made an intellectual analysis in his attempt to describe the world order as it appears today. But the only major historical factor that Fukuyama became oblivious about is that history repeats itself. It is possible to have new style of communism emerging just as the communist china. The Chinese since their opening up, they have claimed a position of communism with Chinese characteristics. Democracy in Iran is liberal, but with certain differences as practiced in the west, for the supreme leader determines the democratic principles which are generally accepted by the Iranian people. The shape of global order is rather reemerging. This is understandable from the European multipolar structure to the present emergence of china. China is not alone, but rather creating a formidable force to make a shift in the unipolar global order which economically and political dominating international system today. When WARSAW reached the horizon, it re-emerged through what is called the shanghai cooperation organization which will sooner counter balance the polarized global power with NATO. This signifies that the global order may soon repeat itself by going back to multipolarity.

Huntington on the End of History and Clash of Civilization

Huntington has provided a rather alternative area of analyzing the concurrent world order which is contrary to the observation and analysis made by Francis Fukuyama. The assertion made by Fukuyama is the stability of liberal democracies and peace among western democratic entities. Fukuyama also observed that, the ideologies of the world have collapsed and others are on the verge of collapse for their failure to compete with the western liberal democracies, values or ideals. Contrary to Fukuyama, Huntington is of the view that the world order is enveloped by the clash of civilization. Clash of civilization according to Huntington goes with islamophobia, the fear of islamization of Europe and Americans, and the fear of extremist Islam taking over the global security system, conditionality, and acting in response to western type democratic, dictatorial and double-standard methodology of the west and America. Huntington believes that Islam is gradually spreading, and there is this clash through misconception and incompatibility of the western values and the Islamic shari'ah, from which every Muslim wishes to have as a source of constitution, self evaluation and judgment. Islam is a civilization on itself, and the western value is another from a different angle. These civilizations have come to clash in this century through media, ideological development and political inventions. Ayaan Hirsi Ali wrote:

What do the controversies around the proposed mosque near Ground Zero, the eviction of American missionaries from Morocco, the minaret ban in Switzerland, and the recent burka ban in France have in common? All four are framed in the Western media as issues of religious tolerance. But that is not their essence. Fundamentally, they are all symptoms of what the late Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington called the "Clash of Civilizations," particularly the clash between Islam and the West (Ibid).

What Huntington tries to portray, however, is the growing nature of Islam after other ideologies such as fascism under dictatorial regimes of Italy, Spain etc collapsed, and the waning nature of communist ideology especially with the collapse of the Soviet Union. One notable example that is pertinent in our analysis is that, the united states had earlier in history supported Taliban in Afghanistan to fight against communist Russia, when the Russians as thought by America does not pose a great threat to the Americans, the united states sees Russia insignificant, because, the soviet union has collapsed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is the same America that is fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaida. These two major groups pose a potential threat to the survival of the United States since after the September 11 attacks. And the Islamic ideology or religion is fast spreading all over the world. Consequently, Huntington sees it as a misnomer for the global order to be called "the end of history." In the argument of Huntington, the primary pillars of the post-Cold War world are seven or eight historical civilizations of which the Western, the Muslim and the Confucian are the most important. The balance of power among these civilizations is shifting. The West is declining in relative power, Islam is exploding demographically, and Asian civilizations-especially China-are economically ascendant. Huntington also points out that a

civilization-based world order is emerging in which states that share cultural affinities will cooperate with each other and group themselves around the leading states of their civilization. The inference to this argument, however, is that:

2The West's Universalist pretensions are increasingly bringing it into conflict with the other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China. Thus the survival of the West depends on Americans, Europeans and other Westerners reaffirming their shared civilization as unique-and uniting to defend it against challenges from non-Western civilizations (Ibid).

It is therefore, apparent that, Fukuyama's argument is somewhat faulty, as the unipolar order is not the end of history, but a continuation of historical order. Just as human society and history are not static, the dynamic nature of these two, will never mark the end of history, but to some extent, it will go further to redefine history. Where Fukuyama knew history has started, the world order may repeat itself by revisiting that historical antecedent by repeating itself.

The Re-emergence of cold war from the Ukrainian crisis

The inception of crisis in Ukraine in February/march 2014 has shown more political zeal of the Ukrainians in Kiev to have political and economic attachment with the west. Russia is also pushing to maintain a greater level of influence on its neighbor. But situation exacerbated when the Ukrainian president, Victor Yanukovich cancelled an economic deal with the European Union in favor of Moscow, this has gravitated a long and bloody protest in Kiev (the Ukrainian capital). [18] With the disappearance of Yanukovich from Kiev, and his whereabouts unknown, his seat was declared vacant, and a new leadership was brought in, a move seen by Moscow as unconstitutional. But Moscow is very much aware that to bring back Yanukovich will be very cumbersome if not completely impossible, it therefore invaded Crimea with thousands of Russian troops. The United States, the European Union and other allies to the west have condemned the move by Moscow to invading Crimea and threatened to impose economic sanctions on Moscow. But Moscow has repeatedly argued that any attempts to impose sanction on Russia, such move will boomerang (Ibid). This push and pull syndrome is seen as a replication of the cold war, where the west and east are still struggling to have more relations from other smaller states within the framework of international politics. The United States has pledged to give Ukraine a \$ 1 billion loan, and the EU has pledged for 15 billion euro as an economic package to Ukraine. This is what transpired immediately after the Second World War and with the inception of the cold war. The United States went to Greece and Turkey to help build their economies, in order to stop any Russian/communist influence on the two states (Ibid).

Impact of the Crisis in Ukraine on Global Politics

With the Crimean and Russian call for referendum and with the approval of the Crimean parliament, a referendum is expected to hold on the 16th of February 2014, for the Crimeans to determine whether to be part of Russia or Ukraine. But it is obvious that the Crimeans will choose to be part of Russia due to their ethnic background. Even if the Crimeans will choose

to be part of Russia, the referendum will not be recognized by the United States and the European Union. There may continue to be economic and political dislocation between Moscow and the west. If Crimea will be part of Russia, Ukraine will be reduced geographically, economically, militarily and its population decreased. Russia will never forfeit Crimea, this may force the United States get defeated and come back with a new relations with Moscow through a process of win-win situation. That is Ukraine to the west and Crimea to Russia. The United Nations will also be forced to either recognize the position of Russia or reject such position. The UN may also agree to the forceful resolution of Crimea as forced by Russia. If all conditions and situations should face a total fiasco, then the move will serve as a declaration of war between Russia and the west. It may become another world war as allies to the west and Russia will participate in the war.

Conclusions

With the geographical proximity between Ukraine and Russia, it will serve as a western victory over Russia if the west should have a control of Ukraine. This is a critical moment which may lead to a violent world war. Russia has kept the tension at a minimal level by not forcefully intending to reinstate victor yunokovych back to the state house in Kiev, but only tries to hold strongly, the island of Crimea. The division of Ukraine into two, one goes to the west and one goes to Russia is the best solution to the problem which is based on win-win situation. This has been determined by the division of Ukrainian people themselves, as someone to be one Ukraine and someone to break from Ukraine to be part of Russia. Referendum is democratic and the people should determine the future of where they belong.

Recommendation

For the sustenance of international peace and security among members of the comity of nations, tensions and rivalry must be contained through the following:

The big powers of the world, such as the United States, Russia, china, France, Britain, Germany etc, must continue to respect the sovereignty of smaller states and relations must be based on mutual respect and benefit. The process of commoditization of ideology and blocs must be stopped, and states must independently relate with the big powers. Commoditization of ideology refers to ideology for sale, as giving a colossal amount of money to a nation in order to determine which camp it belongs to. Power should also continue to be balanced among

the great powers, in order to contain international dictatorship and autocratic tendencies. Countries should also be allowed to relate with whichever nation it wants to. Freedom to have political and economic partners should not only be allowed, but promoted. The two greatest powers of the world (Russia and the US) must continue to deal with international issues with restraint, as if the two should go to war, others will be seriously affected.

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